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Summary 
Fisheries managers in the United States are required to identify and mitigate the adverse 
impacts of fishing activity on essential fish habitat (EFH).  There are additional 
concerns that the viability of noncommercial species, animals that are habitat dependent 
and/or are themselves constituents of fishery habitat may still be threatened. We 
consider a cap-and-trade system for habitat conservation, individual habitat quotas for 
fisheries, to achieve habitat conservation and species protection goals cost effectively. 
Individual quotas of habitat impact units (HIUs) would be distributed to fishers with an 
aggregate quota set to maintain a target habitat “stock” of EFH conservation. Using a 
dynamic, spatially explicit fishery simulation model we explore the efficiency and cost 
effectiveness of an IHQ policy versus alternative marine protected area (MPA) 
configurations, at reducing the risk of extinguishing a habitat dependent species of 
unknown spatial distribution.  Our findings indicate that an IHQ policy with a 
conservatively established habitat target is better suited to the protection of non-target 
species than a rotating or fixed MPA policy. 
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Introduction 
The provisions added to the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 
(MSFCMA) in 1996 require the eight regional fishery management councils to identify and describe 
essential fish habitat in each fishery management plan (FMP); minimize to the extent practical the adverse 
effects of fishing on EFH; and identify actions to encourage the conservation and enhancement of EFH.  
Essential fish habitat (EFH) is defined in the (MSFCMA) as “those waters and substrate necessary to fish 
for spawning, breeding, feeding, or growth to maturity.”  This description was amended to the MSFCMA 
in 1996 when Congress added a provision to protect EFH within the United States.  In addition, councils 
are instructed to “consider the nature and extent of the adverse effect on EFH and the long and short term 
costs and benefits of potential management measures to EFH, associated fisheries, and the nation” (50 
CFR §600.815).  Requirements to protect EFH were motivated by the finding (stated in the 
reauthorization of the MSFCMA) that “one of the greatest long-term threats to the viability of commercial 
and recreational fisheries is the continuing loss of marine, estuarine, and other aquatic habitats.” 
A predominant source of habitat damage is commercial fishing which can reduce the complexity 
of the benthic structure, increase the resuspension of benthic sediments, and alter the community and 
trophic structure within an ecosystem (Engel and Kvitek 1998; Greenstreet 1999; Jennings and Reynolds 
2000; Johnson 2002; McConnaughey et al. 2000; Pilskaln et al. 1998; Rice 2000; Schratzberger et al. 
2002 to name a few).  These impacts may vary with the type of gear utilized (Collie et al. 2000; Johnson 
2002) as well as with the benthic structure (Ball et al. 2000; Bergman and Santbrink 2000; Bradshaw et 
al. 2000; Hall-Spencer and Moore 2000; Johnson 2002).   
Habitat impact also create concerns for the viability of non-target species, the primary focus of 
this paper (Kaiser and de Groot 2000; Pope et al. 2000). One type of non-target species is habitat areas of 
particular concern (HAPC), which may require enhanced protection.   HAPCs are “those areas within 
EFH that are of particular ecological importance to the long-term sustainability of a managed species, are 
of a rare type, or are especially susceptible to degradation or development.” The North Pacific Fisheries 
Management Council (NPFMC), responsible for managing Alaskan fisheries, has identified three habitat   3
types as HAPC: areas with living substrates in shallow waters (e.g., eelgrass, kelp, etc.); areas with living 
substrate in deep waters (e.g., sponges, corals etc.); freshwater areas used by andronomous fish (NPFMC-
EIS 2004).  Therefore HAPC may be characterized as sessile organisms with low rates of reproduction 
and diffusion which are highly susceptible to habitat damage.  The difficulty in managing HAPC is that 
the component species are not commercially targeted and directly managed with catch limits.  For 
instance, species which constitute HAPC such (corals, sponges, kelp, rockweed, and mussels) have been 
labeled “prohibited” species by the NPFMC in order to prevent the establishment of an active market for 
them (NPFMC-EIS 2004).  Therefore management instruments intended to mitigate the impacts of 
commercial fishing may not fully internalize the damage done to HAPC.  
 Proposed actions to mitigate the impacts of commercial fishing consist mainly of gear 
restrictions, temporary area closures, gear/area restrictions, permanent area closures (Marine Protected 
Areas (MPAs) (Horwood 2000; Lindeboom 2000)) and rotational closures (Rotating MPAs).  However, 
the impacts of these policies may parallel or diverge from the observed commercial benefits, depending 
on the dynamic response taken by fishermen and the ecological community interactions present.  In 
particular, there are concerns that EFH protection based on area closures may shift to and intensify effort 
in other areas threatening species that exist primarily or solely in those areas. This may have an adverse 
impact on HAPC and other non-target species.  As an alternative approach, we propose a rights-based 
habitat management regime, using individual quotas for habitat impacts, to provide habitat protection and 
to protect non-target species which are habitat dependent.   
The development of an individual habitat quota (IHQ) management regime is premised on 
expanding individual transferable quotas (ITQs), currently in use within a number of fisheries, to the 
management of habitat.  ITQs have proven effective at increasing the profitability and sustainability of 
fisheries (OECD 1997). The success of an ITQ program hinges on the economic incentives it generates 
and its property rights structure. A fully transferable, exclusive, and well defined ITQ program will force 
fishermen to internalize the externalities present in an open-access fishery.  However, not all the 
externalities of their behavior will be captured in the ITQ program, i.e. habitat damage, unless property   4
rights are extended to incorporate these components.  Extending rights based fishery management to 
include habitat damage can be achieved either through the bundling, or division of resource rights 
(Edwards 2003).  Vernon Smith, was one of the first economists to realize that the separation of these 
rights may be the most appropriate method.  He recommended that a two-tiered water allocation right be 
applied to water resources within the arid Southwest.  One property right would exist for the renewable 
flow of water provided via aquifer recharge and the second right would apply to the non-renewable 
component of the aquifer resource.  This separated the resource into its two most important components: a 
non-renewable and a renewable flow (Smith 1977).  The development of a nested IHQ and ITQ market 
would behave in a similar fashion.  However, the two components would both be renewable with different 
rates of regeneration. 
Under our proposed individual habitat quota (IHQ) regime individual quotas of habitat impact 
units (HIU) based on a proxy for marginal habitat damage would be distributed to fishers with an 
aggregate quota set to maintain a target habitat “stock” within the fishery.  An integrated IHQ and ITQ 
management regime would provide a more complete and efficient property rights structure but may still 
not completely internalize the externalities imposed by commercial fishing.  Although the IHQ system 
would provide incentives to reduce habitat impacts, the impacts on non-target species would not be fully 
incorporated into the economic incentive structure.  Theoretically the ITQ system could be expanded to 
encompass all the components of the ecosystem managed, both target and non-target species (Arnason 
2000) and could be synthesized with a minimum information ITQ regime (Arnason 1991).  However, this 
management regime may be operationally difficult to implement (Holland 2004) and potentially 
infeasible given the lack of accurate biological information.  Therefore, understanding the degree to 
which a nested IHQ and ITQ system, based on a simple and easily monitored proxy for habitat impacts, 
will mitigate these externalities when non-target species are captured and/or harmed via habitat damage is 
of increasing importance. 
To investigate how the IHQ system might perform, we develop a dynamic spatially explicit 
fishery and habitat simulation consisting of three primary components: a target species, a habitat stock   5
and a non-target habitat dependent species.  The survival rate of the habitat dependent species depends on 
the habitat quality in the surrounding area and varies depending on the habitat threshold specified.  This 
corresponds with the documented belief that habitat degradation may yield species extinction (Powles et 
al. 2000).  Given that we currently do not have accurate information with regard to the biological 
characteristics of the non-target species and that they may possess varying degrees of growth and spatial 
growth and recruitment we model a number of non-target species by pairing alternative growth rates with 
varying degrees of spatial growth and recruitment.  
The performance of the IHQ model is compared to two alternative management regimes, fixed 
and rotating MPA policies.  Policies are compared to each other based on their ability to mitigate their 
impact on non-target species and their cost-effectiveness under various degrees of uncertainty, diffusion, 
and ecological structure of the non-target species.  We find that an IHQ system, with a conservatively 
specified habitat target “stock” level is not only the most cost-effective management instrument it is also 
successful at mitigating the effects of commercial fishing on non-target species relative to the alternative 
management regimes. 
Methodology 
An IHQ management regime requires definition and monitoring of the habitat impacts that will be 
allocated and traded.  Because it is unlikely to be feasible or cost-effective to directly monitor habitat 
impacts, we propose that a proxy for habitat impacts, denominated in habitat impact units (HIU), be 
utilized.  HIU would represent the marginal damage that the ecosystem incurs from a single fishing event 
and would vary depending on the ecological characteristics of the region fished as well as the amount of 
fishing that has recently occurred within the region.  For instance, suppose that empirical research has 
shown that a heavily fished area takes 10 years to regenerate to a “pristine” level and that each fishing 
event reduces the quality by 80%.  In addition, assume that HIU are denominated in square meters of the 
benthic structure.  A vessel towing a trawl over 10,000 square meters of “pristine” habitat would incur 
8,000 HIU and leave the habitat proxy at 2,000 HIU.  The next vessel to follow would incur a HIU of 
1,600 HIU and leave 400 HIU.  Assuming that the second vessel was last to fish in the area and an annual   6
recovery rate of 10% of the “pristine” level, the habitat would recover to 1,400 HIU by the following 
year. 
The number of HIU allocated each year would be determined by the managing body according to 
a habitat “target” which characterizes the minimum desired level of habitat quality within the fishery.  All 
HIUs that exceed this threshold, due to the dynamic recovery rate of the habitat, would be allocated to 
vessels within the fleet.  The HIUs would operate in the same manner as a traditional ITQ system.  They 
would be transferable and quota holders would possess an ongoing right to a proportional share of the 
total quantity of HIU allocated each year. Alternatively HIU might be allocated in proportion to ITQ.  A 
given total stock of HIU might be made up of a combination of totally and partially regenerated areas and 
once an area achieves a “pristine” level the marginal addition to the HIU stock is capped. 
Monitoring of HIU use and enforcement could be achieved with a vessel monitoring system 
(VMS) that would continually monitor the vessels’ location and rate of movement.  This would create a 
real-time management regime in which a vessel would incur HIU at any time they fished in a given area.  
Determining when they were fishing could be conducted by monitoring the speed of the vessel or linking 
the VMS to a gear deployment mechanism that would indicate when they were actively fishing.  To be 
effective this system would need to be linked to a continually updated database that could be accessed by 
fishermen in real-time to determine the state of the habitat in a particular area and the HIU use that would 
be incurred by fishing there.  This would not be the true physical state of the habitat but a proxy for the 
habitat quality within the region.  Given the sophistication of the standard electronic mapping equipment 
on board many vessels, compliance with even a high resolution IHQ system should be feasible. 
Simulation Model 
To investigate the performance of an IHQ regime we use a spatially explicit fishery simulation 
model with fish stock, habitat, fishing effort and the non-target species modeled on a (25 x 40) two 
dimensional grid of 1000 cells.  Following Sanchirico (2004), each grid is honeycomb shaped with 
diffusion of the target and non-target population occurring over each of the grid’s six edges (Figure 1).  
To ensure that each cell has the same level of connectivity, we connect the edges of the grid (i.e., fish can   7
move from the right edge to the left edge and from the top to the bottom and visa versa).  This form of 
connectivity eliminates the possibility of edge effects, fish and habitat aggregating at the edge of the 
simulation grid.  Although this reduces the parallelism with real world fisheries it does provide a template 
for comparing the four management regimes simulated without biasing the results towards any one 
policy.  While edge effects are not likely to be important for the IHQ model, the results from the MPA 
models would likely be affected by the location of the MPAs vis-à-vis the grid edges. Within the 
simulation model the target and non-target species move from one cell to another depending on their 
corresponding rates of diffusion while fishermen choose a single cell to fish in each fishing event based 
on expected profitability.   
There are four primary components to the simulation model: target and non-target species 
dynamics, habitat dynamics and fleet dynamics.  All four behave according to the same rules under the 
four alternative management regimes simulated with the exception that fleet dynamics are influenced by 
the use of HIU in the IHQ model and by constraints on where they can fish in the MPA models.  We 
model four alternatives management: a fixed MPA, a rotating MPA and two IHQ policies; one utilizes a 
habitat target of 30% (IHQ_30) and the other a 50% habitat target (IHQ_50).  Performance is measured 
according to a least cost criterion as well as the policies’ capacity to protect a non-target species under 
four separate characterizations of a non-target species and varying degrees on habitat dependence.  
Although our model would allow us to explore various forms of spatial heterogeneity in the fishery, we 
assume a homogeneous fleet cost and productivity across all cells to simplify the analysis and avoid 
confounding effects. 
Target and Non-Target Species Dynamics 
The population of the target and non-target species are similarly modeled as a single cohort and 
therefore we need only track the weight of each species within each cell of the simulated grid.  Each year 
is divided into 50 periods (T=50).  The total catch from cell i in year y and period t is determined by the 
removals by the vessels, v, that choose to fish in location i.  The V vessels in the fleet are deployed 
consecutively within period t, and the population of target and non-target species is adjusted after each   8
vessel is deployed (Figure 2).  The net change in the target species, x
Tar, and non-target species, x
Non, 
accounts first for the commercial harvest, then for growth and recruitment and lastly for net population 
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where the weight of fish, x, is indexed by cell i, year y, period t, and vessel deployment v, the superscript 
M indicates target (Tar) or non-target (Non) species and 
M
t y i x 0 , , ,  represents the respective target and non-
target populations before any fishing takes place.  The catchability coefficients for the target and non-
target species, qTar and qNon respectively, determines the percentage of the cells fish population removed 
by one fishing event and ei,y,t,v takes a value of 1 if vessel v fishes in cell i in year y and period t and value 
of 0 otherwise.  Note that if one vessel chooses to fish in a given location, the population of the target and 
non-target species is reduced before the next vessel is deployed.  Therefore, the subsequent capture of 
both species by a vessel which follows another vessel within the same time period t is lower than the 
preceding vessel. A description of how the location choice of each vessel is modeled is discussed under 
the subheading, “Fleet Dynamics.” 
Total annual growth for the target and non-target population, G
Tar and G
Non respectively, is 
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where x
M
i,y,T,V is biomass of the target or non-target species respectively in cell i, in the final time period T, 
at the end of year y, and δM and K
M are their respective intrinsic growth rates and carrying capacities.   
The spatial distribution of the adult population growth will invariably be correlated with the 
spatial distribution of the adult stock.  However, the spatial distribution of recruitment may be completely 
random.  The ratio between the amount of total growth associated with growth of the adult stock and that 
via randomly distributed recruitment is an important characteristic of the non-target species modeled. A 
locally recruiting species is modeled by distributing all growth proportionately to the adult population.  A 
broadcast spawning species is simulated by allowing a share of total growth to be distributed randomly 
over the entire model grid.  For a local recruiter, spillover benefits will only be realized via emigration of 
adults from one region to another.  For a broadcast spawner, spillover also occurs through recruitment, 
effectively increasing leakage areas where the population is concentrated.   
In the simulation model, the total annual growth is divided into two components, growth from 
recruitment and growth of the existing population.  Parameters αM (M=Tar, Non) determine the share of 
the total growth G
M for the target and non-target species respectively, that occurs through the growth of 
its constituent population.  Growth resulting from the existing population of the adult target and non-
target population is distributed evenly throughout the year and amongst the cells in direct proportion to 
their share of the overall population.  This is represented by the second piece in equation 3.  Growth from 
the recruitment of the target and non-target population is distributed randomly, both over space and 
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where, T is the number of time steps modeled in each year (50),  N is the number of locations within the 
simulation grid (1000) and zi,y,t is a randomly distributed number between 0 and 1 assigned to each cell, 
year and period and captures the random settlement of recruits.  In order to ensure that the random 
distributions of the target and non-target populations were uncorrelated separate “seeds” were used within 
the random number generator.  The last common modeling feature of the target and non-target species is 
the net diffusion. Net diffusion for each group is modeled as 
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where, dM represents the diffusion rates for the target and non-target species respectively and x
M
k,y,t,V  are 
the target and non-target population levels in the six surrounding cells. 
The spatial distributions for the target and non-target species were initialized differently.  The 
target species was randomly distributed throughout the 1000 grid cells within the simulation model and 
then “smoothed” by repeating the diffusion process expressed in equation 4 until the spatial distribution 
possessed only a small degree of variability.  The non-target spatial distribution was created by randomly 
assigning the entire non-target population (totaling 50% of the carrying capacity) to 5 cells and then 
repeating the same “smoothing” process but curtailing it to allow 5 distinct peaks in the spatial 
distribution to persist (Figure 3).  Our rationale for distributing the non-target species in this manner was 
to create a spatial distribution that was random but clumpy.  This distribution would presumably 
correspond with an ecologically sensitive non-target species with a limited  and spatially defined niche in 
the ecosystem. 
The spatial dynamics of the non-target species possesses one additional complexity, the degree of 
habitat dependence of the species.  Utilizing a habitat threshold variable, ξ, the survivability of a non-
target species is determined by 
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where hi,y,t,V represents the habitat level in location i, time period t, year y and following vessel 
deployment v.  The survivability of the habitat dependent non-target species depends on the habitat 
quality within cell i and the six surrounding cells.  Within the simulations ξ is varied between 5% and 
15% of the “pristine” habitat level.   
Simulation Habitat Dynamics 
The habitat stock h in each cell is modeled simply.  We assume that each cell has a homogeneous 
maximum habitat stock level of hMAX and that habitat regenerates at a fixed rate of recovery, r, per a year 
which is capped at the maximum habitat stock level.  As was the case with the target and non-target 
populations, the habitat stock is consecutively depleted by each vessel that chooses to fish within the 
location 
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where γ is the marginal rate of habitat damage, 
0 , , , t y i h is the habitat quality in cell i in year y, time period t 
prior to any fishing activity, whereas  
v t y i h
, , , is corresponding habitat quality following fishing event v and 
ei,y,t,v is as defined earlier.  Within each year of the IHQ model a total quota for habitat is set equal to the 
projected habitat level at the end of the year in the absence of fishing less the target level for the habitat 
stock.  This maintains the habitat stock at the “target” level, yet allows for its spatial distribution to be 
endogenously determined by the fleet.  The habitat, which is distributed evenly among the fleet  is 
calculated as 
   12
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Simulation Fleet Dynamics 
Vessels are motivated solely by profit and their location choice decisions do not depend on the 
effect they have on the non-target species.  The only species they are commercially interested in is the 
target species.  Each year a total allowable catch (TAC) for the target species is set equal to the growth of 
the target population, G
Tar, plus any residual unfished quota from the previous year.  This assures that the 
fleet captures between 99.5% and 100% of the target species TAC each year.  Fish quota is divided 
evenly among fleet.  Therefore, each vessel possesses the same amount of target fish quota and habitat 
quota at the beginning of each year.  The spatial distribution of effort within the fishery is determined by a 
looping process.  Initially the price of habitat is set equal to zero and the vessels are consecutively 
distributed to the areas within the fishery that possess the highest profit, the difference between HIU costs 
and relative expected revenues rates.  The profits observed by each vessel are calculated as 
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h are the price of fish and habitat respectively, σ is an uncertainty multiplier and εi,y,t,v is a 
normally distributed random number with mean zero and a standard deviation of one times the 
uncertainty multiplier σ.  The larger uncertainty multiplier, the greater is the uncertainty each vessel faces 
with respect to the expected catch and revenues realized within a given location thereby increasing the 
probability that vessel’s spatial choice deviates from the true optimum.  However, this multiplier only 
affects a vessel’s expectations, the actual catch realized is deterministic.   
If the target TAC is not completely used up because the THQ is exhausted first the HIU price is 
increased and the year is simulated again.  This looping process continues until a price for HIU is found 
which allows the fleet to catch the entire TAC without exhausting the total quota for habitat.  Although   13
our primary interest is the impact that the IHQ has on the viability of the non-target species it is still 
integrally important that we determine the optimal HIU price because different prices yield different 
spatial distributions of effort.  Alternative spatial distributions result in different impacts on the habitat 
and non-target species than that which corresponds with the optimal HIU value.  The MPA simulations 
allows the fleet size to change so that the fleet size is adequately large, but the minimum size necessary to 
take the TAC. The minimum fleet size is determined through a looping process similar to that used to 
determine the price of HIU for the IHQ policy scenarios. 
Simulation Policy Evaluation 
All simulations begin with the same initial distribution and size of fish population and habitat 
resulting from running the model for 20 years with a TAC equal to that used for subsequent years, but no 
habitat regulations. The habitat management policy is then implemented and the simulation continues for 
an additional 50 years.  After year 20 if the habitat quality is incapable of reaching the habitat target 
specified by the policy (either 30% or 50%) following its incremental growth, the IHQ model sets the 
initial target for the total habitat stock equal to the current habitat stock plus an increment of 10% of the 
virgin level.  The habitat target is then increased in this way each year until it reaches the final habitat 
target (either 30% or 50%) where it remains for the rest of the simulation. For the fixed MPA model, after 
the 20 year initialization, a vertical (25 x 40) strip of cells encompassing 20% of the fishery is then closed 
to fishing and remains closed for the duration of the simulation.  Five separate fixed MPAs were 
simulated corresponding to the five MPAs used in rotating MPA model (Figure 4).   In order to ensure 
that we are not biasing the results away from the fixed MPA model, we have chosen to present results 
only for MPA 5 which provides the best non-target species protection.  This would be expected given the 
initial spatial distribution of the non-target species (see Figure 3).  The rotating MPA model functions 
similarly but rotates the closed area every 10 years of the simulation.  The rotating closures are ordered 
such that each new closure is non-adjacent to the last (see Figure 4).   
To test the sensitivity of our simulations we vary three key parameters: the non-target species 
habitat threshold ξ, the rate of diffusion of the target species and the degree of uncertainty about relative   14
catch rates faced by fishers. Other target species parameters are fixed (see Table 1) for all simulations. 
For the four non-target species biological parameters were fixed for a given species but diffusion and the 
ratio of adult growth to recruitment are different across the species (see Table 2).  The sessile species both 
have very low diffusion rates, but SESS 1 recruits locally while for SESS 2 two-thirds of the net growth is 
assumed to be from recruitment that is distributed randomly over the model grid.  DEM1 and DEM2 
represent two alternative classifications of non-target demersal species.  DEM 1 possesses a low rate of 
diffusion and DEM 2 possesses a diffusion rate 3 times that of DEM 1 and both are assumed to be 
broadcast spawners with 50% of total growth associated with recruitment.  Otherwise the species within 
the two sub-classifications remain identical.  The parameters were selected not to mimic a specific non-
target species but to represent species which possess asymmetric biological characteristics to develop a 
broad class of species representations. 
Results 
The cost effectiveness of the four policies can be evaluated by comparing the catch-per-unit effort 
(CPUE) obtained under each of the four policies. Since total catch and its value is constant under all 
policies and harvest costs are solely a function of nominal effort, a higher CPUE directly translates to a 
proportionally lower harvest cost and proportionately higher profitability.  Because CPUE varies with the 
diffusion rate and uncertainty with no habitat protection in place, we present the average CPUE for the 
four policies simulated (21 ≤ y ≤ 70) as a percentage of the average CPUE obtained within the simulation 
prior to the policy implementation (20 ≤ y).  
CPUE is only marginally reduced by implementation of the IHQ regime and this result is robust 
both to the rates of diffusion and uncertainty (Figure 5).  In the IHQ model with a 30% habitat target, 
CPUE was maintained at more than 99% of the pre-IHQ level regardless of the rate of diffusion or 
uncertainty. With a 50% habitat target, CPUE was maintained at more than 97% of the pre-IHQ level. 
The greatest reduction was with the highest level of uncertainty.  
CPUE results for the MPA regimes (fixed and rotating MPAs) are always below that of either 
IHQ regime, but the rotating MPA policy maintains higher CPUE than the fixed MPA (Figure 5). CPUE   15
with the rotating MPA is maintained at 93% to 96% of pre-MPA levels while it ranges from 46% to 90% 
for the fixed MPA. Higher diffusion tends to result in a somewhat larger decrease in CPUE for the 
rotating MPA policy, while higher uncertainty has the opposite effect, but neither result in large 
differences in CPUE. Diffusion has a much more pronounced impact on CPUE for the fixed MPA models 
(Figure 5a ). The percentage of pre-policy CPUE with no uncertainty rises from 46% to 90% as the 
diffusion rate rises from 0.01 to 0.03 (Figure 5a). At the lowest rates of diffusion the fleet size required to 
capture the TAC with a fixed MPA doubles within the first 20 years, both reducing the CPUE and greatly 
increasing the total nominal effort required to take the TAC.  This results because the target species 
concentrates within the MPA and little spills over into the fishing grounds. Uncertainty has a relatively 
small impact on CPUE with the fixed MPA, causing it to fall from 46% to 45% of the pre-MPA level as 
the rate of uncertainty increases from 0.0 to 0.25 while maintaining the diffusion rate at 0.01 (Figure 5b).   
Although the quota price may be irrelevant from a public cost-benefit perspective, because it 
represents only a wealth transfer rather than an increase in real cost, it may be of great importance to an 
individual who has to purchase HIU or has the opportunity to lease or sell their allocation. With no 
uncertainty, the price of HIU is very low, but it rises steeply with increasing uncertainty resulting in a 19-
32 fold increase in the habitat quota price depending on the diffusion rate (Figure 6). Diffusion rates also 
influences the price of the habitat quota, with high diffusion rates causing the price of habitat quota to fall 
(Figure 6).  Uncertainty has the largest impact on the price of habitat quota.  Increasing the habitat target 
also results in substantially higher habitat quota price, p
h.  Holding the level of target species diffusion at 
0.01 the habitat quota price increases between 200% and 300%, depending on the uncertainty level 
present, as the habitat target is increased from 30% to 50%.   
Our primary focus is on the ability of different habitat protection policies to preserve non-target 
populations, and we provide a detailed discussion of those results below. However, it is notable that the 
different policies also lead to significantly different levels of average habitat quality. The IHQ regime sets 
and maintains an absolute target for average habitat quality though it does not dictate the spatial 
distribution of habitat impacts and quality. In contrast, the average habitat quality with the fixed and   16
rotating MPA regimes varies with the diffusion rate of the target species and uncertainty. Average habitat 
quality with fixed MPAs varies between 20% and 40% of the maximum depending on the level of 
diffusion and uncertainty. With the lowest diffusion rate, average habitat quality for the entire grid is 
maintained at a minimum of 20% by the MPA, but habitat quality outside the MPA approaches zero. This 
is because to the increased level of effort required to take the TAC when diffusion is low. The rotating 
MPA results in an average habitat quality ranging from 25% to 33% of the maximum. As with fixed 
MPAs, higher diffusion rates lead to higher average habitat quality. However, average habitat quality 
fluctuates, falling substantially in the 2-3 years after rotation and then rebuilding until the next rotation.  
Non-Target Species Impacts 
Although the non-target species populations are initialized at 50% of their capacity, they are 
already substantially reduced by year 20 when the habitat policy is introduced. Since the catchability 
coefficient on the non-target species is quite low, this is primarily a result of habitat loss rather than 
fishing mortality. The higher the habitat threshold, ξ, the more the non-target species populations are 
reduced before any of the four policies are implemented (Figure 7).  Population levels prior to habitat 
protection are also affected, though less dramatically, by the diffusion rate of the target species and 
uncertainty in its distribution. In some cases, when the non-target species has a 15% habitat threshold, it 
has been pushed close to extinction even before the policy is implemented.  Although this is true for a 
number of the parameterizations, there still exist substantial differences in the pre-policy and post-policy 
populations across species (see Table 3).  The greatest reduction in non-target species population prior to 
habitat protection occurs with the DEM 2 population and the least with the SESS 1 population.  This is 
driven by the diffusion rate of the target species and the degree of local recruitment.  DEM 2 has the 
highest diffusion rate of all the non-target species populations increasing the probability of moving from 
areas of sufficient habitat quality to areas of poor habitat quality where they can not survive.  The SESS 1 
population has a very low diffusion rate and local recruitment so movement or recruitment to areas of low 
habitat quality is reduced.    17
These pre-policy impacts illustrate that for extremely sensitive non-target species it is paramount 
that habitat protection be implemented early to avoid substantial reductions in their population levels from 
which they may fail to recover regardless of the means of habitat protection.  For most of the non-target 
species, with the habitat threshold set at 15%, the mean population over the duration of the policy (21 ≤ y 
≤ 70)  fell relative to the mean at the beginning of the policy’s implementation and in no case did it 
substantially recover (Table 3).  The only cases where the population did not show further decline are the 
fixed MPA for SESS 1 and the IHQ_50 model for SESS 1, SESS 2 and DEM 1. The IHQ_50 model 
yields a larger increase in SESS 1 than the fixed MPA for all but the lowest target species diffusion rate.  
With lower habitat thresholds, the non-target species are maintained at more healthy levels. As we discuss 
in more detail, the results vary significantly by non-target species and policy. Target species 
characteristics also impact non-target populations, particularly the diffusion rate of the target species. 
Sessile Organisms 
Results for the two sessile organisms simulated, SESS 1 and SESS 2 respectively, are illustrated 
as the habitat threshold, ξ, of the non-target species increases from 5% to 15% of the pristine habitat level 
(Figure 8 and 9).  Results are expressed in terms of the mean population over the duration of the policy 
simulated (21 ≤ y ≤ 70) as a fraction the non-target species’ carrying capacity.  The top row of each figure 
illustrates the role that the target species diffusion has on the population of the sessile organism assuming 
the median uncertainty level (σ = 0.125). The bottom row illustrates the role of uncertainty assuming the 
median target species diffusion rate (dTar = 0.02).  As we noted above the population of the sessile 
organisms is most influenced by the habitat threshold.  Increasing the habitat threshold from 5% to 15% 
yields a reduction in the non-target species population from nearly 60% of the carrying capacity to below 
0.01% of the carrying capacity for some combinations of habitat protection policy and fishery 
characteristics (Table 3).  This would be expected because only a small amount of effort is required to 
reduce to habitat level below the 15% threshold given that the habitat catchability coefficient is 80% ( γ = 
0.80).     18
The target species diffusion rate has different impacts on the results for the fixed and rotating 
MPA models as compared to the IHQ management regimes.  For the fixed and rotating MPA models 
increased diffusion increases the mean population level of the SESS 1 and SESS 2 organisms.  The 
percentage increase in the non-target species populations as the diffusion rate increases from 0.1 to 0.3 is 
most pronounced when the habitat threshold is 15% (Table 3).  For SESS 1 the population increases 
655.83% and 1640.00% for the fixed and rotating MPA models respectively.  However, despite the large 
percentage increase, with a rotating MPA the sessile species populations still remains below 1% of the 
carrying capacity. At the lowest habitat threshold (5%) the percentage increases are substantially smaller 
(27.25% and 5.07% respectively) although the absolute increases in the population size are larger.  For 
SESS 2 the corresponding increases are 1116.13% for the fixed and 502.44% for the rotating MPA, 
assuming a 15% habitat threshold and 44.76% and 5.14% respectively, assuming a 5% habitat threshold.  
However, it is important to note that the absolute population levels are substantially smaller under the 
higher habitat threshold.  These reductions often exceed 87% of the population maintained at the 5% 
threshold. 
Diffusion has the opposite effect with the IHQ regimes, when the habitat threshold is low to 
moderate.  For both the IHQ_30 and IHQ_50 model increased diffusion decreases the mean population of 
SESS 1 and SESS 2.  However, these reductions never exceed 0.5% of the mean population indicating 
that the performance of both regimes is only marginally influenced by the diffusion rate of target species.  
When the habitat threshold equals or exceeds 10%, increased diffusion actually increases the mean 
population of the non-target species for SESS 1 and SESS 2 under the IHQ regimes.  
Uncertainty in the distribution of the target species has a unilaterally negative effect on SESS 1 
for all of the policies simulated and habitat thresholds less than 15%.  Fixing diffusion at 0.02 and varying 
uncertainty from 0 to 0.25 results in a 2.33% to 24.48% reduction in the SESS 1 population for the fixed 
MPA model, a 2.04% to 46.98% reduction for the rotating MPA, a 0.78% to 32.76% for the IHQ_30 
model and 0.69% to 21.48% reduction for the IHQ_50 model as the habitat threshold increases from 5% 
to 12.5%.  The largest of these reductions occur at the 12.5% habitat threshold.  When the habitat   19
threshold is 15% increased uncertainty results in an increase in the SESS 1 population for fixed and 
rotating MPAs and for the IHQ_50 policy.  These increases are 54.95%, 5.88% and 7.06% for the fixed 
and rotating MPAs and the IHQ_50 model respectively.  Uncertainty has a similar role on the SESS 2 
population, yet the relative reductions in population are slightly greater than those indicated for the SESS 
1 species.  Under the IHQ_30 policy increasing uncertainty results in a unilateral decrease in the 
population, but for the IHQ_50 policy it results in small increases in the population for the median range 
of habitat thresholds (10% and 12.5%).   
While there are some parameter combinations under which the fixed MPA policy leads to equal 
or higher sessile population levels, the IHQ_50 model generally provides the greatest protection for both 
sessile species.  It is only at low habitat thresholds with moderate to high levels of diffusion and 
uncertainty that the fixed MPA model provides more protection than the IHQ_50 policy and both policies 
maintain the sessile populations around 60% in those cases.  The relative performance of the fixed MPA 
and the IHQ_50 policy is generally reversed when the habitat threshold increases to 10% or higher.  
When the habitat threshold ranges from 12.5% to 15% the populations of SESS 1 and SESS 2 with the 
fixed MPA are between 15% and 58% of the population maintained under the IHQ_50 regime, with one 
exception. With the  highest habitat threshold combined with low diffusion and moderate uncertainty the 
SESS 1 population with a fixed MPA is 103.5% of the IHQ_50 level. 
The rotating MPA provides less protection to the sessile species than either fixed MPAs or IHQs 
in nearly every case.  It is only at low habitat thresholds that this policy performs moderately well, but as 
the habitat threshold increases the mean population of the sessile organisms dramatically decreases in 
absolute terms and relative to other policies. When both the diffusion rate and the habitat threshold are 
low, the rotating MPA does outperform the fixed MPA, but not the IHQ policies.  Comparing the IHQ_50 
regime to the alternative habitat quota regime, IHQ_30, indicates that for habitat thresholds from 5% to 
10% the IHQ_30 model maintains a population of the non-target sessile species between 94.30% and 
99.33% of the population under the IHQ_50 regime.  However, for higher habitat thresholds the IHQ_50 
policy results in significantly higher sessile species populations.    20
Demersal Organisms 
The habitat threshold has a similar effect on DEM 1 and DEM 2 as it did on SESS 1 and SESS 2.  
Increasing the habitat threshold dramatically reduces the population size regardless of the form of habitat 
protection.  For all of parameterizations of the DEM 1 and DEM 2 simulations, assuming a 15% habitat 
threshold, only two models yielded a mean population level greater than 0.5% of the carrying capacity 
and both instances occurred in the IHQ_50 for DEM 1 (Table 3). 
The effects of diffusion on the ability of each management regime to protect the demersal species 
is similar to the effects on the sessile species.  For the fixed and rotating MPA models the mean 
population of DEM 1 and DEM 2 increases with diffusion.  Within the IHQ_30 and IHQ_50 models 
diffusion decreases the mean population level at low habitat threshold, ξ ≤ 10%, and increases the mean 
population at higher habitat thresholds, ξ > 10%.  In addition, the relative increase in the mean population 
for both demersal species increases as the habitat threshold increases.  For instance at the 12.5% habitat 
threshold, the population of DEM 1 increases 328.23%, 493.75%, 187.14% and 124.15% for the fixed 
MPA, rotating MPA, IHQ_30 and IHQ_50 models respectively as the level of diffusion increases from 
0.01 to 0.03.  Although these appear to be substantially large gains it is important to note that the mean 
populations are small, never exceeding 26.19% of carrying capacity.  For the IHQ models, when the 
habitat threshold is 5% the mean population levels decrease between 1.25% and 1.66% for the IHQ_30 
and IHQ_50 models.  However, this marginal reduction is less important given that the population levels 
are always above 50% of the carrying capacity. 
Uncertainty of the target species has a similar impact on both DEM 1 and DEM 2 causing the 
mean population of the non-target species to decrease.  The negative effect of uncertainty is more 
pronounced in the fixed and rotating MPA models than the IHQ models.  For instance, an increase in 
uncertainty from 0 to 0.25, assuming a habitat threshold of 10% yields a reduction in mean population of 
66.70%, 64.67%, 13.90% and 8.85% for the fixed, rotating, IHQ_30 and IHQ_50 models respectively for 
DEM 1.  For  DEM 2 the corresponding reductions are 82.14%, 77.81%, 19.33% and 11.87% for the four 
respective policy simulations.  Comparing IHQ_30 to IHQ_50 it is easy to see that the IHQ_50 is better   21
able to absorb the adverse impact of uncertainty.  For both DEM 1 and DEM 2 the IHQ_50 yielded a 
smaller reduction in the mean population as uncertainty increased and it maintained a substantially larger 
population of the non-target species. 
Contrasting DEM 1 and DEM 2 it is evident that the higher diffusion rate of DEM 2 makes it 
more difficult for all of the four policies to protect the species.  For nearly all of the parameterizations the 
mean population of DEM 1 exceeds that of DEM 2.  Comparing the four policies to each other it is 
evident that both of the IHQ models protect the non-target species better than either the fixed or rotating 
MPA models.  In addition, when the habitat threshold is low to moderate, ξ ≤ 10%, the IHQ_30 yields a 
mean population level that is usually within 5% of the population level maintained under the IHQ_50 
regime for both DEM 1 and DEM 2.  However, as the habitat threshold increases the mean population 
level under the IHQ_50 is nearly double that under the IHQ_30 regime.  The comparisons between the 
fixed and rotating MPA models made for SESS 1 and SESS 2 are reversed for DEM 1 and DEM 2.  The 
rotating MPA model either outperforms or tracks the mean population of the fixed MPA model, which is 
substantially different than its performance within the SESS 1 and SESS 2 simulations.  
Discussion 
The policy simulations conducted illustrate a number of general findings regarding the relative 
performance of the four policies simulated and the sensitivity of their performance to both the biological 
characteristics of the target species as well as those of the non-target species.  We discuss seven general 
findings that may be drawn from the policy simulations. 
General Finding One: An Individual Habitat Quota (IHQ) management regime is more cost- 
effective than either a fixed or rotating MPA policy at maintaining a given level of habitat quality.  
The CPUE results for the four policies simulated indicate that an IHQ management regime is the 
most cost-effective alternative.  The higher CPUE achieved under the IHQ regimes is robust to the target 
species diffusion as well as uncertainty (Figure 5(a) and 5(b)) and is not greatly reduced even when the 
habitat target is increased to 50%.  In contrast, the cost-effectiveness of the fixed MPA is very sensitive to 
the diffusion rate. The primary negative impact of raising the habitat target is the substantial increase in   22
the habitat quota price within the fishery. This may increase the probability of noncompliance and require 
more spending to ensure compliance. 
General Finding Two: Higher habitat thresholds make it more difficult to protect the non-target 
species regardless of the species’ biological characteristics and interaction with the target species.  
For the entire habitat thresholds simulated the population unilaterally decreases as the habitat 
threshold increases (Figure 7).  This occurs regardless of the target species diffusion rate or the level of 
uncertainty within the fishery.  This result indicates that protecting an extremely sensitive non-target 
species is difficult, and even closing large areas to fishing may not provide sufficient protection.  An 
MPA is capable of protecting the population that resides within it but may increase and concentrate effort 
in the fishing grounds which remain open, thereby further exacerbating the habitat problem.  Increasing 
the size of the closed areas may increase the protection to habitat dependent species if it is correctly 
located, but it may substantially increase harvest costs. Furthermore it is likely to exacerbate the damage 
in the smaller area left open increasing the risk to any habitat dependent species that are not provide 
protection by the MPA.  
General Finding Three: The greater the target species diffusion, the greater is the ability of both 
MPAs and IHQs to protect the non-target species. 
Diffusion has the most pronounced effect on the fixed and rotating MPA models.  For the fixed 
MPA model, a low diffusion rates dramatically decrease the ability of the fixed MPA to protect the non-
target species.  This results from the rapid increase in the fleet size that is required to capture the TAC as 
the target species becomes concentrated within the fixed MPA with little spill over into the fishing 
grounds.  This increase in fleet activity dramatically reduces the habitat level outside of the MPA and 
causes the non-target species to be virtually wiped out within this region.  At higher diffusion rates this 
does not occur because the required fleet size is significantly smaller because more of the target species 
migrates out of the MPA.   
For the rotating MPA a similar phenomenon occurs but it is temporally dynamic.  The fleet 
concentrates all of its effort in recently opened MPAs because the low diffusion target species   23
concentrates within the MPA prior to being opened.  This intense effort within the former MPA causes 
the habitat to substantially deteriorate and wipes out the non-target species.  At higher diffusion rates the 
target species becomes less temporally concentrated within the MPA.  This reduces the adverse impact of 
fishing in a former MPA as effort is slightly more spread out within the fishery. 
For the IHQ regimes, diffusion combined with a low habitat threshold yielded a small reduction 
in the population. However, with higher habitat thresholds, where the risk to non-target populations is 
much greater, higher a higher diffusion of the target species generally increases the protection that the 
IHQ system provides just as it does for MPAs.   
General Finding Four: Higher degrees of uncertainty in target species distribution decrease the 
ability of each policy to protect the non-target species. 
A higher degree of uncertainty causes the amount of pristine habitat within the fishery to be 
reduced because it causes effort to by more greatly distributed.  For the IHQ regime it results in fishing in 
areas that would otherwise have remained completely unfished. For instance, as uncertainty increases 
from 0 to 0.25, holding diffusion at 0.01, the percentage of pristine habitat maintained over the last 20 
years of the simulation decreases from 13.52% to 9.26% for IHQ_30 model and 43.71% to 40.23% for 
IHQ_50.  For the MPAs, uncertainty reduces the tendency of vessel to concentrate on the periphery of the 
closed area. This spreading out of the habitat damage increases the probability that the habitat in a region 
will not meet the habitat threshold specified for the non-target species, thereby increasing the probability 
that the non-target species will go locally extinct within that region. 
General Finding Five: The relative performance for the fixed and rotating MPA models to each 
other depends on the biological characteristics of the non-target species. 
The success of the fixed and rotating MPA models depends on its ability to provide a spatial 
refuge for the non-target species.  However, the degree of spatial refuge they provide hinges on the 
biological characteristics of the non-target species.  For the two sessile organisms modeled the fixed MPA 
performed much better than for the two demersal species.  This fundamental difference was driven by the 
diffusion rate of the sessile organisms as well as the placement of the MPA.  The sessile species have a   24
diffusion rate one-tenth that of DEM 1 and one-thirtieth that of DEM 2.  The low diffusion rate of the 
non-target species reduces leakage, increasing the level of protection provided by the fixed MPA.  
However, if the MPA is not fixed the population is immediately captured as fishermen flood into the 
opened area to harvest the target species, which has also utilized the MPA as a spatial refuge.  This 
renders the rotating MPA incapable of protecting either the SESS 1 or SESS 2 species.   
An increased degree of global recruitment of the non-target species influences the performance of 
the fixed and rotating MPA models in a similar way to increased diffusion.  This is driven by the fact that 
habitat damage is concentrated outside of the MPA and this decreases the probability that the non-target 
species’ recruits will survive should they settle within this region.  A species that is a local recruiter will 
concentrate their recruitment effort in the region where abundance is the highest within the MPA.  
However, the protection provided to the recruits settling in the rotating MPA is only temporary. They are 
concentrated there and then eliminated when the area is reopened. 
General Finding Six: The degree of protection provided for the non-target species with an IHQ 
policy is less sensitive to the characteristics of the target and non-target species than either MPA policy. 
The level of protection of each of the non-target species provided by a particular habitat 
protection policy is sensitive both to the non-target species characteristics and to the target species 
parameters because it is the distribution of the target species that drives the fleet dynamics and the 
resulting deleterious effects on the habitat and the non-target species. Finding a policy instrument that is 
robust to many alternative biological characteristics of the target and non-target species will be extremely 
useful given the current status of our biological knowledge. The percentage changes for all four non-
target species with IHQs were much smaller than the percentage changes cited for the fixed and rotating 
MPA models as various parameters were changed. This robustness indicates that the IHQ regimes provide 
better protection of the non-target species when there is uncertainty in the target and non-target species 
biological characteristics.    25
General Finding Seven: A conservatively set THQ, IHQ_50, is better suited to the overall 
protection of a non-target species than the alternative management regimes regardless of the 
characteristics of the target and non-target species. 
In general, the IHQ_50 policy appears to provide the greatest protection to the non-target species 
regardless of its characteristics or those of the target species. This is driven by the high average habitat 
quality mandated by the IHQ policy (50% of the pristine level). From the simulation results it evident that 
the IHQ_50 management regime provides the most consistent protection for the non-target species 
simulated. For all of the DEM 1 and DEM 2 simulations it yielded a higher mean population level than 
the alternative management regimes. For the SESS 1 and SESS 2 the IHQ_50 outperformed the 
alternatives for all the simulations except for those with a low habitat threshold. However, given that the 
IHQ_50 model still performs extremely well under these situations and far outperforms the fixed MPA 
model under the alternate parameterizations it is a superior policy. 
Plotting the mean populations of the sessile and demersal organisms for the fixed and rotating 
MPA models as a percentage of the mean population maintained under the IHQ_50 regime illustrates its 
strength (Figure 12). In some cases the fixed MPA performs reasonably well relative to the IHQ_50 
policy. This is true for SESS 1 for which the fixed MPA model is able to maintain the SESS 1 population 
at or above 80% of the IHQ_50 regime’s mean population. The fixed MPA model performs less well for 
SESS 2 and poorly for DEM 1 and DEM 2. The DEM 1 and DEM 2 populations are consistently and 
significantly below the mean population levels maintained under the IHQ_50 regime. For the rotating 
MPA model the mean populations of the all four species modeled relative to populations with the IHQ_50 
policy are consistent, but never exceed the mean population of the IHQ_50 regime. As the habitat 
threshold increases the relative performance of the rotating MPA worsens.  
Conclusions 
These simulation results suggest that a conservatively set IHQ management regime is not only the 
most cost-effective means of achieving a given average habitat quality, it is also capable of providing 
sufficient protection for habitat dependent non-target species. Presumably, it is possible to establish   26
alternative habitat dependent non-target specifications and threshold constraints that will increase the 
desirability of utilizing MPAs. However, for the parameters illustrated the IHQ models performed 
remarkably well and they illustrate some of the pitfalls of using MPAs to protect non-target species.  
We have assumed a homogeneous habitat type within our simulated fishery and we expect that it 
may be important to ensure some level of protection for all types of habitat present. This could be 
achieved by mapping the spatial distribution of alternative habitat types and creating a multi-type habitat 
quota management regime with habitat targets, as well as degradation and regeneration rates, to manage 
each type. This would be analogous to an ecosystem based individual transferable quota (ITQ) 
management regime (Arnason 2000). This should improve the performance of the IHQ regime at 
protection habitat dependent species assuming that their distributions are correlated with the separate 
habitat types identified and regulated.  
An IHQ system may force fishermen to incur a substantial upfront cost to implement the 
management regime. However given the cost savings achieved relative to the alternative management 
regimes the IHQ regime may still be preferable. There will invariably be some objections voiced by 
fishermen since the IHQ system will require high resolution tracking of their activities and will make that 
information available to other fishers (though it would not identify which vessels have been fishing 
where). However, achieving the sufficient protection of benthic habitat, as well as its constituent non-
target species, is likely to require a compromise between privacy and preserving a fisherman’s freedom to 
choose where and when to fish.    27
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Table 1: Target species parameters 
Parameter  Value 
Growth Rate δTar  0.40 
Carrying Capacity K
Tar  2,000,000 
Adult Growth Share of Total Growth αTar  0.50 
Fish Catchability Coefficient qTar  0.40 
Habitat Catchability Coefficient γ 0.80 
Maximum Annual Habitat Regeneration Rate Per Cell rT 0.1*hmax 
Price of fish p
f  1.00 
Diffusion Rates dTar  0.01-0.03 
Uncertainty Multiplier σ 0.0-0.25 
Fleet Size  10 for IHQ, Variable for 
MPA 
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Table 2: Non-target species parameters. Paremeters in bold font indicate those that varied for 
each type of species.  
Parameters  Sessile 
One (SESS1) 
Sessile 
Two (SESS 2) 
Demersal 
One (DEM 1) 
Demersal 
Two (DEM 2) 
Growth 
Rate, δNon 




200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 
Adult Share 
of Growth, αNon 
1.0 0.3333 0.5 0.5 
Catch Rate, 
qNon 






Init. Pop.  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000 
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Table 3: Pre-policy and post-policy non-target population comparisons at the 15% habitat threshold, 
varying target species diffusion and uncertainty within the fishery (Diff., Unc.). 
Population/Policy   (15%) 
y=20 
 FIX  % 
Change 
 Rotat.  % 
Change 
 IHQ_30  % 
Change 
 IHQ_50  % 
Change 
SESS1                        
(0.01,0.125)   0.0057   0.0120 111%   0.0005 -91.2%   0.0048 -15.8%  0.0116  104% 
(0.02,0.125)   0.0433   0.0616 42.3%   0.0044 -89.8%   0.0363 -16.2%  0.0781  44.6% 
(0.03,0.125)   0.0657   0.0907 38.1%   0.0087 -86.8%   0.0525 -20.1%  0.1202  83.0% 
(0.02,0)   0.0516   0.0546 5.8%   0.0051 -90.1%   0.0392 -24.0%  0.0836  62.0% 
(0.02,0.25)   0.0511   0.0846 65.6%   0.0054 -89.4%   0.0358 -29.9%  0.0895  75.1% 
SESS2                        
(0.01,0.125)   0.0052   0.0031  -40.4%    0.0004 -92.3%   0.0036 -30.8%  0.0094  80.8% 
(0.02,0.125)   0.0403   0.0221  -45.2%    0.0041 -99.6%   0.0307 -23.8%  0.0709  75.9% 
(0.03,0.125)   0.0626   0.0377  -39.8%    0.0084 -86.6%   0.0489 -21.9%  0.1129  80.4% 
(0.02,0)   0.0498   0.0247  -50.0%    0.0057 -88.6%   0.0373 -25.1%  0.0819  64.5% 
(0.02,0.25)   0.0475   0.0292  -38.6%    0.0049 -89.7%   0.0305 -35.8%  0.0793  66.9% 
DEM  1                       
(0.01,0.125)   0.0002   0.0000  Ext    0.0000  Ext    0.0000  Ext   0.0002  0% 
(0.02,0.125)   0.0046   0.0007  -84.8%    0.0003 -93.5%   0.0011 -76.1%  0.0049  6.5% 
(0.03,0.125)   0.0095   0.0014  -85.3%    0.0006 -93.7%   0.0026 -72.6%  0.0126  32.6% 
(0.02,0)   0.0078   0.0018  -76.9%    0.0007 -91.1%   0.0025 -67.9%  0.0096  23.1% 
(0.02,0.25)   0.0051   0.0007  -86.3%    0.0003  -94.1    0.0010 -80.4%  0.0048  -5.9% 
DEM  2                       
(0.01,0.125)   0.0001   0.0000  Ext    0.0000  Ext    0.0000  Ext   0.0000  Ext 
(0.02,0.125)   0.0001   0.0000  Ext    0.0000  Ext    0.0000  Ext   0.0001  0% 
(0.03,0.125)   0.0004   0.0000  Ext    0.0000  Ext    0.0000  Ext   0.0003  -25% 
(0.02,0)   0.0065   0.0000  Ext    0.0000  Ext    0.0001  Ext   0.0005  -92.3% 
(0.02,0.25)   0.0002   0.0000  Ext    0.0000  Ext    0.0000  Ext   0.0001  -50% 
(Ext indicates that the species went virtually extinct within the simulation because the population did not exceed 0.0000 of the carrying capacity 
within the fishery)   32
 
Figure 1: Spatial structure of simulation model. Fish diffusion takes place across all edges. All cells have 
the same degree of connectivity since the right and left edges of the grid are connected as are the top and 
bottom. For example, in addition to the adjacent cells, cell 2,1 is connected to cells 1,m and 2,m. Corner 
cells connect opposite sides and opposite corners. For example, cell 1,1 connects with cells n,1; n,2; 1,m; 
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Figure 2: Flowchart of the simulation model 
 
Policy Initiation Phase of the Simulation Model : Parameterization of the Policy Simulation 
•  Initialize Policy Variables (e.g. IHQ, MPA scheme) 
•  Initialize Exogenous Variables (e.g. target and non-target species parameters, uncertainty level, 
diffusion) 
•  Initialize State of Fishery When Habitat Policy Implemented 
Annual Loop – Begin Next Year if y <= Y else end loop 
•  Determine TAC (target species) and THQ for year y 
•  Initialize Matrix of Random Numbers to Distribute Recruits for the non-
target and target species. 
•  Initialize Matrix of Random Numbers for Uncertainty  
•  Reset Habitat Price or Fleet Size 
Habitat Pricing (IHQ) or Fleetsize (MPA) Loop  
•  Increment Habitat Price if THQ exhausted before TAC (IHQ)  
•  Increment Fleet Size if fleet too small to take TAC (MPA) 
•  Else end loop 
Period Loop – Move to Next Period if t< = T else end loop 
 
Fleet Loop – Deploy Next Vessel  if v<=V else end loop 
 
Vessel Chooses Fishing Location 
•  Target and Non-Target Stock Reduced from 
Fishing (determined by qTar and qNon) 
•  Habitat Proxy Reduced (determined by γ) 
Growth Occurs 
•  Target and Non-Target species growth and 
recruitment (determined by αTar and αNon) 
•  Habitat Proxy Regenerates (0.1*hmax) 
Target and Non-Target species diffusion Process 
(determined by dTar and dNon) 
   34



































Figure 3(b): Initial Spatial Distribution of the Non-Target Population
   35
Figure 4: Diagram of Area Closures for MPAs. For Fixed MPAs, MPA 5 remains closed the entire 
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Figure 5: Average post-policy CPUE as a percentage of pre-policy CPUE with (a) varying rates of 
diffusion and no uncertainty, and (b) the lowest diffusion rate and varying uncertainty. 
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Figure 6: Average habitat quota price for the IHQ policy assuming a 30% habitat target and various rates 
of diffusion and uncertainty. 
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Figure 7: Pre-policy mean non-target species population in year 20 expressed as a fraction of the species 
carrying capacity. Because the pre-policy population levels of SESS 1 and SESS 2 are graphically 
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Figure 12: Plot of mean non-target population maintained under a fixed or rotating MPA policy as a 



























































Fixed MPA vs. IHQ with 50% Habitat Target
Rotating MPA vs. IHQ with 50% Habitat Target
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